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7. Managing crises and their consequences

Chapter findings

Australian experience in crisis management provides useful pointers for broader whole of government work.

Crises demand fast and effective whole of government responses-it is important to establish political will and authority early to drive this response. Clear understanding of the role and responsibility of all of those involved in the response is also critical.

Ironically, a crisis environment supports effective whole of government coordination. Disputes about mandate are set aside, decision making is accelerated by the ongoing involvement of senior agency leaders, and political will drives policy formulation and implementation.

Effective policy responses during crises can be assisted by the use of existing rules and liaison points and traditional chains of command. A 'hubs and spokes' model can be valuable in coordinating interagency response to different aspects of a crisis.

A focus on rigorous policy implementation is important in driving the dynamic from crisis to recovery. At the same time, strategic use of partnerships outside government can also be valuable.

Effective and integrated public affairs management is critical during crises. An independent person who can speak authoritatively on technical or scientific issues can be valuable in restoring or developing public confidence. Protocols should be developed to guide decisions about when departmental employees, rather than ministers, should lead public communications.

Even though whole of government crises are often unpredictable, agencies can increase their expertise by planning in advance. Agencies should work together in an everyday business environment to continue to learn about crisis management, test their internal arrangements and maintain consultative links with the community. Information and expertise can be shared through publication of papers and journal articles, attendance at conferences and use of web pages. Opportunities for joint training to improve agencies' ability to work together should be sought.

It is important that crisis management protocols and practices keep pace with changes in the nature of potential threats, environment, technology and political imperatives.

These are just interim lessons. The Australian Government is likely to find itself responding to new and different crises which will provide further lessons about a whole of government approach. Nevertheless, the key lesson remains enduring: learn from the last crisis in planning for the next one.

  • Australia has a proud record of responding well to crises.
  • All those involved in a crisis recovery want to help as much as they can. Unlike some whole of government tasks, goodwill is not an issue in crisis management.
  • Lessons learnt about whole of government crisis management include:
    • plan early and test the plan
    • establish clear leadership
    • define roles of all players early
    • use formal chains of command
    • ensure strong public affairs management.

Introduction

This chapter focuses on effective whole of government work in extreme circumstances. The Australian Government has been successful in responding to crises at home and abroad. There are many lessons for whole of government activities. With the decline in the international security environment following the attacks in the United States on 11 September 2001 and the proliferation of new and frightening security threats including bioterrorism, crisis management has been elevated as a policy priority for all Western governments.

Crisis management is, of course, well-practised and has long been a traditional priority in many fields of public policy, such as civil aviation safety, emergency medical responses and public health.

This chapter focuses on crisis management in response to both traditional (natural hazard, exotic animal disease) and new (terrorism) threats, drawing together key lessons.

Australia's emergency management arrangements

There are a number of key players in emergency responses...

Under the Australian constitution, each state and territory government retains responsibility for protection of the lives and property of their citizens. Effective disaster prevention, preparedness, response and recovery require the close involvement of police, fire, state emergency service, ambulance, medical services, hospital and other government agencies which provide services to the community. Local government and voluntary organisations also play important roles, as both groups have close links with the community.

While no legislation requires the Australian Government to act in emergencies, it has always accepted a responsibility to assist the states and territories where their resources are insufficient or inappropriate for the situation.

EMA administers two key plans for disaster response

A number of Australian government disaster response plans are administered by Emergency Management Australia (EMA). The most important for the purposes of this chapter are the Commonwealth Government Disaster Response Plan (COMDISPLAN) for physical assistance to the Australian states and territories, and the Australian Government Overseas Disaster Assistance Plan (AUSASSISTPLAN) for assistance overseas.

Crisis response architecture

Political will is integral to the crisis response

In discussing Australian government responses to crises, it is useful to note the political context. With agencies taking their cues from ministers, a whole of government response will be conditioned by the strength of political decisiveness and unanimity among ministers. The response to the tragic terrorist attack in Bali on 12 October 2002 underscores this observation. From the outset, the Prime Minister's instructions to senior officials were decisive: the government's response needed to be comprehensive and effective. Issues concerning resources could not be allowed to constrain the policy response-these matters could be addressed later. There was strong bipartisan support for the government's approach.

Chains of command need to be clear and must be used

Reflecting these decisive political instructions, the government established explicit and appropriate chains of command. Given its responsibility for consular services to Australians in distress overseas, the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT) was tasked to coordinate the whole of government response to international aspects of the crisis. Domestically, the Department of Family and Community Services (FaCS) coordinated government policy and delivery of assistance to Australians and their families affected by the crisis. A clear lesson from Bali was the extent to which overseas events can resonate at the local community level, underlining the importance of domestic and state/territory agencies being activated early in response to a major overseas crisis.

The decisive establishment of clear roles and chains of command in this case contrasts with comments by McConnell and Stark1 concerning the response by the UK Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food to the outbreak of foot and mouth disease (FMD) in February 2001. The authors describe the response as 'suffering from an institutional malaise and a fragmentary civil service, incapable (at least in the early stages) of providing a 'joined-up' response to match the scale of the crisis'.

In the case of Bali, two 'hub and spokes' models were used to coordinate the whole of government response. DFAT took on the 'hub' role in coordinating the interagency 'spokes' response to international aspects of the crisis. At the same time, FaCS took on another 'hub' role, coordinating the interagency 'spokes' response to domestic aspects of the recovery.

The two clusters of 'hub and spokes' worked alongside each other, attending each others' meetings where necessary, to provide a comprehensive overall response.

'Hub and spokes' keep leadership roles clear within government

The 'hub and spokes' arrangement worked well to draw together key agencies and players to share information and coordinate policy responses. In the context of the chapter on structures, this approach represented the combination of two interdepartmental committees, each chaired by a line agency.

Figure 7.1: International aspects: crisis phase-interagency emergency taskforce

Chart showing DFAT at the centre of a taskforce working with other agencies

Figure 7.2: Domestic aspects: recovery phase-interagency emergency taskforce

These arrangements provided the context for effective consultation, rapid decision making, close attention to the implementation of decisions, and action to address new or unforeseen difficulties. Within each committee, clear directives identified the roles and responsibilities of respective agencies, thereby ensuring that mandate issues were resolved early.

Figures 7.1 and 7.2 illustrate these institutional arrangements.

While a 'hub and spokes' structure could be used in a range of crisis scenarios where there is a distinction between international and domestic issues or another clear thematic division, ultimately portfolio departments should ensure that their own crisis plan thinks through linkages for different scenarios relevant to their particular portfolio or industry structure.

Traditional rules are important...be wary of short cuts

A number of observations can be made about this approach. First, within each 'hub and spoke' there was a clear division and respect for the different mandates of respective agencies. Rather than normal bureaucratic rules being abandoned, there was a strong appreciation that the simplest and most direct means of achieving goals was to use the appropriate agency and established channels.

Efforts at short-cutting, even where motivated by a noble desire to expedite an outcome, were ultimately more likely to result in delays and confusion. The use of traditional channels of liaison and coordination means that new relationships do not need to be established in the tumult of a crisis situation. This provides a higher degree of comfort for downstream organisations, such as state authorities, which are involved in delivering a specific response.

Coordination by DFAT for international issues and FaCS for domestic issues reflected the overall responsibilities of the two departments: DFAT has responsibility for consular services overseas, assisting in responding to the deaths of about 700 Australians overseas each year; FaCS supports Australian families in need.

Both DFAT and FaCS held daily (twice daily in the initial aftermath of the attacks) interagency taskforce meetings which drew major stakeholders together to share information and coordinate policy responses. APS employees attending these meetings were at a senior level, meaning they had the authority to make on-the-spot decisions on behalf of their agency.

The Bali response brought together a diverse range of agencies, many with little prior experience in working with each other. However, participants worked cohesively and collaboratively throughout the period. They were hindered little by the different departmental cultures and work practices which are found in the APS.

While Chapter 3 argues that organisational culture is the key to whole of government success, crisis draws forth a high level of goodwill which appears to eliminate cultural barriers.

A plan is being formulated to establish nationwide protocols for how future crises will be handled

One of the key lessons from the Bali attack was the decision to establish an overarching national plan, to be coordinated by EMA, to provide a framework for coordination to:

  • clarify the roles of agencies and non-government organisations in crisis responses
  • review links between Australian government and state disaster plans
  • identify and rectify any gaps in interagency coordination arrangements.

The development of the National Response Plan for Overseas Mass Casualty Events will provide the blueprint for federal and state contingency plans to be examined further and tested against a variety of different scenarios.

While the government's response to Bali was pursued through the parallel processes of the 'hub and spokes' models, there was no competition or mandate clash between the two structures.

In the days after the Bali attack, as the evacuation of injured Australians was completed, remains stabilised and positive identification of the deceased began, the transition from crisis phase to recovery phase was well advanced. In fact it was important that activities associated with the recovery phase were conducted in tandem with activities associated with the crisis response. While there was no clear distinction in the transition from one phase to the next, the emphasis of policy making increasingly shifted from international to domestic aspects.

Driving the dynamic from the crisis to the recovery

In driving response from crisis to the recovery phase, a high degree of discipline is required to ensure decision making is followed through by rigorous implementation and follow-up. Coordinated whole of government policy making and implementation is integral in driving towards the recovery phase.

Within the FaCS Bali response taskforce, 15 core issues were addressed in each daily meeting, with recent progress and forward planning reported against each. The core issues were: public communication; financial support; domestic health services; disability issues; counselling; return of effects of deceased victims to next-of-kin; community harmony; community support; rural issues; intergovernmental welfare issues; role of airlines; insurance coverage; domestic economic issues; international issues; and interaction with other disasters. The daily review of these issues ensured that policy outcomes were closely monitored and driven forward.

Make time to be strategic and to rise above the problems of the moment

Similarly important is the need for crisis managers to rise above the maelstrom of the moment and obtain a more strategic view of the overall policy response. One way to do this is to create a regular opportunity for key decision makers to briefly canvass what might be the policy and media issues of the day. This discipline assists in ensuring that decision making continues to strike a balance between the proactive and the reactive, looking beyond the issues of the moment. In the case of Bali, these approaches meant that within seven days of the attack the focus of government decision making had moved smoothly from the international to the domestic, from crisis to recovery phase.

Current crisis response architecture

The Bali response outlines high-level whole of government crisis response architecture in action. There must also continue to be a focus on current emergency plans and arrangements, as demonstrated by the 2002-03 bushfires. The bushfire season proved to be one of the worst on record resulting in widespread destruction in both urban and rural areas over large tracts of eastern Australia.

With resources in NSW, Victoria and the ACT severely extended there were a number of requests from the states and the ACT for Australian government assistance. These were coordinated by EMA and met by the Australian Defence Force. Assistance provided included: helicopters, aviation and diesel fuel tankers, water tankers, portable generators, bulldozers and graders, accommodation for firefighters, chainsaw crews, planning, logistics and communications specialists, and buses. EMA also positioned liaison staff in NSW, Victoria and the ACT to assist with coordination of Australian government support and information on the fire situation.

The response drew on current arrangements between the Australian Government, the states and territories, as well as between Australian government agencies. Though not on the same scale as the Bali emergency, the response was an example of a whole of government approach, with current arrangements again proving to be effective.

Preparing for a crisis

Good preparation is the key to effective management during a crisis

Effective crisis management is founded on good preparation. This should include: negotiation of protocols with likely key participants and stakeholders; maintenance of the crisis infrastructure to ensure it is ready to use at any time (this includes fundamentals such as after-hours contact lists of key employees from other agencies); and appropriate training and development to ensure people can fulfil key roles, whatever the dimensions of the crisis.

Human resource issues also need careful attention-a sustained crisis has the potential to burn out key people. One of the lessons of the Australian Government's foot and mouth simulation, Exercise Minotaur, was the need for agencies to look at human resource capacity in a number of key areas, particularly that of skilled and trained technical employees. Experience indicates that the long-term nature of individual and community recovery will also place significant strain on human resources.

A further recurring issue is the need for a compatible communications system which allows information to be shared quickly between agencies without the need for special handling. The Bali response, for example, showed that two agencies (DFAT and FaCS) that had rarely communicated with each other before found electronic communications difficult.

Review of crisis management systems should be ongoing

Agencies can also prepare for a whole of government crisis during normal business operations. The formal review and reform of existing processes following a crisis is vital. This needs to be undertaken on a whole of government basis and it is critical that agencies come together to pool lessons learnt and negotiate reforms to their own departmental processes.

Resource and financial management systems need to be in place to respond to crisis situations

Another part of forward planning is the development of financial management protocols to give APS employees the discretion to authorise action. Once a crisis has begun, financial systems must be able to deliver appropriate resources to enable decision makers to quickly meet policy priorities, while also satisfying Australian government financial guidelines.

This lesson is illustrated by the issuing of ex gratia payments by the Australian Government which are covered neither by legislation or regulation. Such payments require written authority, normally from the Prime Minister. However, Australian government agencies need to understand how these payments will be handled where a decision and announcement has been made at the ministerial level, but corresponding authorisations are not yet available. While the lag may be only 24 hours, announcements about government assistance will trigger an immediate response from the community. Departmental secretaries may need to develop a consistent approach to flexible bridging arrangements to ensure financial assistance can be provided quickly in times of crisis.

Crisis responses need testing

It is also important to test crisis management systems during normal business operations. Agencies have contingency plans that map out how the agency will respond in a range of different scenarios. Such plans require regular review, monitoring and testing to ensure they can deliver against their stated goal. Desktop and trial exercises are important, both within agencies and across the whole of government.

The Australian Government comprehensively tested its response systems in 2002 through Exercise Minotaur. The breadth of the simulation was impressive, with the scenario testing diverse issues such as animal health responses, trade advocacy skills, and even consular dimensions. The simulation was conducted over four days in September 2002, after 12 months of planning. More than 1000 people from a range of government and industry agencies were formally involved, with the simulation oversighted by a panel of evaluators and observers.

Review existing protocols and practices

Some private sector corporations have taken testing one step further by using 'internal assassins'-well-versed employees who devise worst-case business disruption crises to test management systems. Testing such as this on a whole of government basis would mean crisis management responses could be reviewed to ensure existing protocols and practices keep pace with changes in the threat environment, technology and political imperatives.

Exercise Minotaur enabled a thorough testing of the foot and mouth disease coordination arrangements, which were subsequently agreed in a Commonwealth-State Memorandum of Understanding signed in December 2002. This simulation also highlighted the importance of response protocols that include 'fire drills' to make sure that all systems are working well, including a managed approach to public communication. An approach like this moves beyond frameworks and standards, and puts in place specific action pathways with which all players can become familiar.

Identify possible barrier to effective crisis management

The period between crises also provides an opportunity to review possible jurisdictional barriers to an effective crisis management. There are a number of possible sources for such difficulties. The first lies in the balance of powers between the Australian Government and state/territory governments, with divisions of responsibility established by the constitution. Protocols are required to ensure that the whole of government response at the Australian government level is matched by seamless coordination at the state/territory level.

Experience has shown that email should be used with some caution for priority communication during crisis management. Systems need to be robust enough to cope with the increased demands of a crisis and employees need to regularly monitor email to ensure responses are not delayed.

The potential for information management issues to arise during a crisis also needs to be considered. State and Australian government agencies collect an array of data about individuals. However an agency's obligations under the Privacy Act will impact on what information can be shared between agencies.

A common approach to privacy issues

The Privacy Act can allow pragmatic decisions in times of national disaster. However, the need for personal data to be protected means it is difficult to collect information from different authorities to support ongoing whole of government work during a recovery period.

Agencies may find it useful to develop a common approach to understanding the way in which the Act applies to their operations in a crisis. Without this common understanding, different interpretations of the Act can lead to inconsistent policy formulation and agency responses during the crisis.

Learning from other countries

Approaches to whole of government crisis management in other countries can also provide learning opportunities for Australia. The UK Government has established rapid deployment crisis teams which can move within 24 hours to lead the government's response to an overseas crisis. The exact composition of the teams, possibly drawn from a range of agencies including foreign affairs, law enforcement and aid delivery, would depend on the nature of the crisis, from a natural disaster to a terrorist attack. The capacity of the teams to work together is likely to hinge on joint training opportunities. The pre-crisis development of a solid understanding between team members of each other's responsibilities and portfolio mandate would be vital.

Lessons from crises can have wider application

Lessons learnt through crisis management can also be applied to other whole of government work. All agencies address business continuity issues and lessons learnt here can be disseminated throughout the APS using reports such as this one.

Public communication

Governments have to deliver in times of crisis

Times of crisis provide a litmus test of a government's capacity to work cohesively to convey information, extend medical, financial and counselling support and provide reassurance and leadership to its citizens.

Community expectations are influenced by a government's record in responding to previous crises, as well as by media commentary which closely shadows every government statement and action. The media impact on driving community expectations and turning public opinion cannot be underestimated by crisis managers.

Educational and reassuring messages are needed

As the crisis management response unfolds in the context of community expectations, government messages can be roughly divided into two categories:

  • educational messages that seek to reshape community expectations in cases where expectations exceed the power and authority of the government
  • reassuring messages that confirm that the government response will be generous and equitable.

Getting the balance right in blending these messages requires sophisticated and well-integrated public affairs management.

The importance of public affairs management in educating and shaping community expectations was underscored in the response to the Bali bombings. In the aftermath of the attack, there was considerable public anguish about the disaster victim identification process. The Indonesian Government implemented a positive identification process, in line with international norms and protocols. Although undertaken swiftly, the collection of information about victims from Australia meant that the identification process could not be undertaken immediately.

This generated anxiety within Australia. Calls were made for the Australian Government to assume responsibility in Bali, thereby overriding Indonesian sovereign responsibility for its coronial processes. Others suggested that Australia should encourage the Indonesians to set aside international norms, thereby running the risk that a less rigorous identification process might lead to a serious and tragic error.

Agencies should work together to send a single and simple message

Given the intensity of media coverage of the Bali attacks, the educational message was difficult to advance. However, primary agencies, such as the federal and state police services, DFAT and coroners, worked to send a single and simple message: that the positive identification process, which was being properly implemented by the Indonesian Government, was the only appropriate course. Media commentary and community expectations shifted fairly quickly towards a clearer understanding of the issue.

Reassuring messages to the community were delivered swiftly in the Bali example. Given a clear mandate to support Australians affected by the bombing, FaCS established a taskforce that arrived quickly to assist the community on a range of issues: emergency medical treatment, assistance for family members to visit loved ones at interstate hospitals, the establishment of family liaison officers to work one-on-one with those affected, and long-term packages of support.

Experience has shown that a case management approach can provide effective liaison and support for affected families. This should be based on clearly defined agency roles and responsibilities and be provided by appropriately trained employees.

Support packages in times of crisis require careful judgement

Determination of the level of support provided to victims and their families required careful judgement. Issues of precedence were considered as similar support packages had been provided following other crises, including the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks in the US and the Port Arthur massacre. There was also a need to be clear about the extent of flexibility around the application of the guidelines which provided assistance. This was important to ensure the government's approach was not criticised for being either too strict or too lax. Clearly, this balance was struck as media treatment and the community's response to assistance measures were uniformly positive.

In the aftermath of a crisis, the community's need will be for information more than for support. Over time, this will change

It is important to carefully consider the full range of community needs in the aftermath of a crisis. As well as financial assistance, people affected need information and will naturally turn to media or other sources to meet this need. The Bali experience showed too that people directly affected crave information over emotional support, at first. Over time, as the implications of the crisis become clearer, community need will, however, turn to counselling and social support. Nevertheless, this switch from information to support needs to be judged carefully and timed correctly to ensure the government's communication efforts are appropriately formulated. In the aftermath of Bali, FaCS established a newsletter for affected families. The newsletter conveyed the government's key messages and ensured that the messages were tuned to the emotional and information needs of families at different times.

The most effective public affairs strategy will be delivered in an integrated whole of government fashion

A major challenge in informing the community is to make sure every agency is giving out the same message. This is difficult in any whole of government task and more so in the fastmoving environment of crisis response.

While web-based information is an excellent way of providing a suite of information with links to partner agencies and other relevant sites which can be accessed at all hours, some caution is needed as some areas of Australia have difficulty opening and downloading some sites. Caution also needs to be used to ensure websites are not the only source for information.

In the Bali response, a number of different agencies needed to contact families to provide information on different elements of the government's response. DFAT consulted families about whether their loved one had told their family they were safe2, while police were in touch with families to seek material for the victim identification process, and Centrelink employees provided information about government assistance packages.

Develop common questions and answers for use by all agencies

While each agency provided contact details about where crossportfolio questions could be directed, none was initially able to answer queries from a whole of government perspective. However, a common set of questions and answers was quickly developed to meet this need. As Chapter 4 on information management and infrastructure makes clear, there is scope for the APS to become more sophisticated in anticipating and sharing whole of government information requirements to better meet the needs of those affected.

One option to ensure messages are conveyed consistently and to avoid multiple agencies contacting families in times of already high stress is to delegate authority to a single agency to represent the Australian Government. In planning for an approach like this, agencies would benefit from regular contact with each other during normal business operations (e.g. prior to Bali, contact between DFAT and Centrelink occurred only rarely). This would assist people to understand other corporate cultures and agency core priorities, roles and responsibilities.

Another option would be to establish a trained group of employees in a nominated agency to coordinate the Australian Government's liaison with affected families in times of crisis. A parallel might be the military reserve. Military action is not their 'day job', but they can go into action at any time.

The handling of media briefings in times of crisis is also important. In some cases, a media briefing might be more appropriately handled by departmental employees, given technical or other specific knowledge required on a subject. An example of this was the decision during the SARS outbreak to use the Commonwealth Chief Medical Officer to lead media briefings. Given the technical complexity of many potential crisis triggers (e.g. animal disease) there may be value in establishing a protocol to guide when departmental employees, rather than ministers, should lead public communications.

There is new media coordination under the National Counter-Terrorism Committee

Work to integrate whole of government public affairs management has been taken forward by the Attorney-General's Department under National Counter-Terrorism Committee arrangements. This is aimed at ensuring that if there is a domestic terrorist crisis, careful public affairs management will reduce the scope for both rumour to replace information and for multiple or contradictory statements by different agencies.

These measures rest on five key principles:

  1. The community has a right to be informed and information should only be withheld if its release would be to the detriment of the national interest, including operational security.
  2. Public information management and media liaison can play a key role in national security operations, and therefore must be strategic, accurate and undergo all necessary clearances.
  3. Agencies must not comment on another agency's area of responsibility without first seeking appropriate approval from the agency in question.
  4. All agencies have a responsibility to ensure they have a single point of coordination contact, as well as appropriately trained media liaison employees and resources to respond to any national security incident.
  5. It is the responsibility of all agencies to ensure they have clear coordination processes within their own agencies, with their ministerial offices, and across agencies.

In order to embed these principles in organisational behaviour, training workshops are being run which bring together public affairs employees from various governments. These workshops will not only improve skills but also build links between media staff to ensure that a collaborative approach is taken during a crisis.

Partnering with non-government and private sector

Use strategic partnerships with non-government players in a creative fashion...

The community has high expectations about the substance of the Australian Government's actions during a crisis. It can be valuable to use strategic partnerships that agencies have developed in normal day-to-day business operations to assist in this response. In the Bali response, a company with longstanding experience in mass casualty incidents, Kenyons International, was contracted within 24 hours of the attacks to manage the repatriation of all deceased Australians on behalf of the Australian Government. Qantas also agreed to put on additional flights to repatriate the many hundreds of Australians who wished to leave Bali immediately.

...including the use of NGOs

From the non-government field, the Red Cross agreed to coordinate all voluntary requests for assistance from the community, drawing on its long record in the field of international humanitarian issues. The Red Cross was also a member of the domestic taskforce and provided important support to individuals such as non-Australian citizens who were affected by the bombing but were unable to access assistance provided by FaCS.

...and volunteers

Volunteers too may need to be integrated into the overall crisis response effort. Whether planning for crises at home or overseas, agencies need to include the capacity and desire of Australians on the ground to play a constructive role in the crisis response. Clearly, with the degree of volunteer support unknown until the crisis hits, this role needs to be carefully scoped and defined.

The likelihood of unaffiliated volunteers appearing should also be addressed. If there is no role for volunteers, this willingness to assist could translate into understandable frustration-most likely vocalised-about the Australian Government's handling of the crisis. The Department of Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry has recognised in developing its foot and mouth plans the need to harness local communities, given their pivotal role in providing additional, appropriately qualified human resources to any foot and mouth disease emergency.

Consult with the community between, as well as during, crises

Ongoing consultation with the community is also important. Once a crisis has begun, it is also important that the affected community is involved in, and has a sense of ownership of, their own recovery. Consultation should also occur before a crisis, as part of an agency's contingency planning arrangements. There are some useful examples of how this consultation can occur. Over recent years, the government and livestock industries have reached a comprehensive agreement on the sharing of costs in dealing with outbreaks of 63 animal diseases. The agreement was a landmark as it established a positive partnership of responsibility and decision making involving industry.


1 A McConnell and A Stark, 'Foot and Mouth 2001: The Politics of Crisis Management' in Parliamentary Affairs, 55, 2002, pp. 664-81.

2 Following the attacks, the department pursued more than 5000 whereabouts inquiries triggered by families registering concern that their loved one may have been in Bali at the time of the attack.