Tackling Wicked Problems : A Public Policy Perspective

7. Reviewing the Accountability Framework

There is some inevitable tension between the horizontal responsibilities in working across organisational boundaries and the vertical accountabilities embedded in the Westminster system of Cabinet Government, in which the existence of separate portfolio agencies reflects an underlying accountability of individual Ministers to Parliament. Some of the literature argues that the devolution of authority to agency heads and a clearer vertical accountability for agency outcomes may have exacerbated such tensions. The MAC report, Connecting Government argued, however, that the flexibility fostered by devolution can facilitate a more innovative approach to wicked problems. ‘The challenge is to find the infrastructure, processes and practices that might promote better connections and remove any obstacles to collaboration that devolution may have raised. These include relevant skills and culture, an information-sharing infrastructure and governance arrangements that focus accountability on the whole of government outcomes the government is seeking.’¹⁹

It is relevant, however, to pose a range of questions about the compatibility of the existing accountability framework and the capacity of APS agencies to effectively tackle wicked problems. Is the requirement to tightly specify programme outputs and outcomes useful in an environment where even defining the problem and solution is difficult? Does the accountability framework within which APS agencies operate have enough flexibility for programmes that are aimed at outcomes that may not be evident for years (for example, experience and research from the COAG trial evaluations confirm that whole of government and partnership approaches aimed at changing the economic, health and social circumstances of disadvantaged communities, in particular Indigenous communities, require long-term commitments of 10 to 20 years in order to be realised)?²⁰ Does the current accountability framework pose a barrier to APS agencies becoming more innovative, flexible and adaptable in their policy formulation and programme implementation when tackling wicked problems?

There is no doubt that the use of outcomes and/or performance-based budgeting and reporting has been an important driver of public sector reform and improved efficiency. The requirements are designed to enable a continuum of specificity from shared outcomes to more tightly specified outputs. However, there appears to be a need for a more sophisticated understanding of how to apply this flexibility.

There is increasing evidence that some types of pre-set performance measures, especially lower-level indicators, may undermine the responsiveness of the delivery of complex services and could even distort or constrict the services being delivered by making the indicator (or target) rather than the service the focus of provision.²¹ In the case of devolved services both service providers and service users can find themselves playing second fiddle to programme reporting regimes.²² Programme definitions can also restrict providers’ capacity to exploit significant intersections with other services (for example, the role and operations of family relationship centres, the courts and child support services).

There is a range of coordinating mechanisms, within the current accountability framework, that have a focus, inter alia, on whole of government projects. These include the Cabinet Implementation Unit and the Department of Finance and Administration’s Gateway Review process. The new Strategic Review process, which was introduced in 2006–07, will also provide scope to review programmes and policies that affect more than one agency. Strategic Reviews are designed to provide information to assist the Government to set its priorities in the Budget process. Reviews will focus on areas where outlays are significant or growing strongly; where fiscal risk is high; where there might be overlap and integration issues across agencies; or where activity has not been subject to recent substantial review. Strategic Reviews will be coordinated by Finance, but will involve full consultation with affected agencies. Reviews may be undertaken by central agencies, eminent persons, or other government bodies. Reviews will be guided by Terms of Reference, with the aim of considering the appropriateness (whether the activity is consistent with the Government’s policy objectives), effectiveness (how well the activity delivers on its objectives) and efficiency (what is the economic and fiscal cost of delivering the activity) of Government programmes.²³ Care will also need to be taken to ensure that strategic reviews consider appropriate time frames because, as discussed above, the most complex policy issues usually need longer time frames for results to become apparent.

Wicked problems also pose challenges for traditional approaches to accountability and governance within agencies. Ideally, governance structures would encourage collaboration and assist in generating an awareness of and a focus on the complex issues that cut across internal organisational structures. The Australian Public Service Commission’s publication, Building Better Governance,²⁴ provides practical guidance on the building blocks for effective governance and includes some useful case studies. These case studies, in particular, highlight the potential benefits of a stronger focus on a principles-based approach rather than governance by specific rules. This approach is consistent with a more flexible approach to wicked problems as it can increase senior management’s ability to apply a broader, future- oriented strategic approach, including a focus on whole of government issues.

It is beyond the scope of this paper to make a detailed assessment of the compatibility of the Australian Government accountability framework with agencies’ ability to tackle wicked problems. However, it does appear that there is a need to consider further how the current accountability framework can meet the goal of maintaining acceptable levels of accountability while minimising as much as possible any barriers to innovation and collaboration.

19 Management Advisory Committee, Connecting Government, p. 6.

20 Morgan Disney & Associates 2006, Synopsis Review of the COAG Trial Evaluations: Report to the Office of Indigenous Policy Coordination (OIPC), p. 4.

21 See G. Kelly, G. Mulgan and S. Muers [200?], ‘Creating Public Value: An Analytical Framework for Public Service Reform’, UK Cabinet Office, Strategy Unit, p. 9 <http://www.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/strategy/downloads/files/public_value2.pdf>

22 See, for example, J. Teicher, Q. Alam and B. Van Gramberg, ‘Managing Trust and Relationships in PPPs: Some Australian Experiences’, International Review of Administrative Sciences, Vol. 72, No. 1, March 2006, p. 90, where a number of reviews by Australian Government agencies are cited; M. Horn et al 2004, A New Approach to Assisting Young Homeless Job Seekers, Hanover Welfare Services, South Melbourne <http://www.hanover.org.au>; L. Kerr, E. Carson and J. Goddard, ‘Contractualism, Employment Services and Mature-Age Job Seekers: The Tyranny of Tangible Outcomes’, The Drawing Board: An Australian Review of Public Affairs, Vol. 3, No. 2, November 2002, p. 89.

23 The scope and type of review and approach to responding to reviews will be agreed by Senior Ministers on recommendations made by the Budget Co-ordination Committee (comprised of Deputy Secretaries of the Departments of the Prime Minister and Cabinet, the Treasury and Finance).

24 Australian Public Service Commission 2007, Building Better Governance <http://www.apsc.gov.au>