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Managing the interface with ministers and the Parliament

SES Breakfast *
23 April 2004
Andrew Podger
Public Service Commissioner

The relationship between the administrative and political arms of Government is always a contentious issue, particularly in an election year and after a Government has been in power for several terms. Accusations of excessive responsiveness, or politicisation, or of a 'cowed' Public Service, tend to arise in line with political cycles: new Governments are suspicious of the Public Service they inherit and longstanding Governments are considered to have so successfully ensured responsiveness that they have compromised the apolitical and professional standing of the Service. In an election climate, these suspicions tend to get a higher political profile, and the normal bureaucratic response is to keep our heads down.

That normal response is reasonable and appropriate for most public servants, as we do need to be careful not to be drawn into the partisan debate. But the leaders of the Service need also to provide guidance to our staff, and to foster confidence in our professional role and responsibilities. We need to consider carefully whether the current interest in this issue is purely cyclical, or reflects more fundamental changes and concerns. Whatever the reason for the interest, we need to respond to any questions our staff may have.

This is obviously relevant to me given my statutory responsibilities, but it is also relevant to Agency Heads and the SES who have statutory responsibility to promote as well as to uphold the APS Values.

Historic background

Just recently, we in Australia forgot to celebrate the 150^th anniversary of the Northcote-Trevelyan Report. That Report became the cornerstone of the apolitical, professional Civil Service in Britain, based on merit. It achieved the principles of merit and political neutrality by a set of administrative processes such as formal examinations for entry into the Service, a life-long career structure with limited lateral recruitment and internal competitive processes for promotion, and a strong central authority to oversight and review employment decisions. These established the Civil Service as an institution in its own right within the executive arm of government, introducing a new element of the balance of powers in the Westminster Parliamentary system of government (where the separation of powers between the executive and the legislative is less distinct than in presidential democracies).

The Northcote-Trevelyan model was translated into some Australian State public administrations before the turn of the twentieth century, and the new Commonwealth Public Service inherited it after Federation. The first Public Service Act of 1902 introduced a powerful Public Service Commissioner, and Duncan MacLachlan (the first Commissioner) epitomised the professional approach with strong discipline, ensuring the Commonwealth avoided the cronyism that still existed in many of the States.

Notwithstanding this highly regulated approach, there were still controversies particularly over Permanent Secretary appointments, and two of the first Secretaries were accused by some of being political appointments. So the accusation of politicisation is not new.

But after seventy five years, the dominant concern was the reverse-that the Public Service was too independent and not sufficiently responsive to the elected Government. That was the first of the three themes that ran through the Coombs Royal Commission Reports. Successive governments-Whitlam, Fraser, Hawke/Keating, Howard-all felt the Service was too slow to respond to their democratically determined authority, and over the last twenty years in particular we have seen a series of measures taken to improve our responsiveness to the elected Government.

Interestingly, the other two themes from the Coombs Report have also influenced our relationship with Ministers and the Parliament. The theme of increased efficiency and effectiveness was the precursor of devolution and competition and the New Public Management reforms of the 1980's and 1990's. The monopoly position of the Service in both advice and service delivery has come under considerable challenge as a result. The other theme of greater community participation has also been reflected in associated reforms that entail considerable two-way communication on policy and management, administrative law changes increasing transparency and rights to review, and greater diversity within the Service and mobility with the outside.

As a result our systems of accountability have become more diffuse, and the pressure for responsiveness both to the elected Government and the public at large has increased. Steadily increasing Parliamentary oversight has also opened the Service up to some direct accountability to Parliament, rather than exclusively through Ministers.

Some observers see these changes as "democratisation". Certainly they have placed the unique role of the APS under considerable challenge.

Yet the challenge can be exaggerated. The principles behind Northcote-Trevelyan remain largely the same. There is more emphasis on responsiveness and on performance and results, but the principles of impartiality, apolitical professionalism and merit remain firm. The bigger change has been how these principles have been reinforced. Now we articulate the principles in terms of the APS Values, and have freed up the rules. We do not have central examinations, centrally determined classification structures, an almost exclusively career-based Service, or a central employer.

Implications of recent changes

It is worthwhile taking stock of the changes of the last twenty years or so. One approach is to consider the possible shifts in risks and the implications for managing them.

The Commission is visited by many international delegations every year, particularly from developing nations. They are keen to learn from our experience including the New Public Management measures they see have delivered considerable benefits. While proud of our achievements, I am uneasy about the direct applicability of some of our recent reforms to these nations. What are the risks for, say, Papua New Guinea or the Solomons if they devolve all employment authority and rely on statements of Values?

The facts are that the APS already has a deeply embedded culture of apolitical professionalism and impartiality. This has allowed us to devolve and free up the system without excessive risk. The Public Service Commissioner and the Auditor General play important roles here, but generally they can take a reasonably light-touch approach. Our Parliamentary committees are also strong and experienced, and able to respond if our devolution is not adequately balanced by accountability for performance and for general integrity of process.

Yet we must also recognise that we have shifted the risk equation. Increased emphasis on responsiveness was, in my view, well justified and is still required. Moreover, as mentioned, there have always been questions about improper political interference in public administration and there always will be. But the sustained increase in emphasis on responsiveness must have increased the risk to our other obligations of being apolitical and openly accountable, as there is inevitably some tension between these obligations. We would be silly to deny this.

The issue is how do we in the APS manage this shift in the risk, and foster all the traditional and still relevant virtues and culture of our institution, that are clearly in the public interest. What are the responsibilities in particular of the APS leadership cadre?

Values and Relations with the Government and the Parliament

The APS Values are set out in the Public Service Act 1999. All APS employees are by law required to uphold them. Agency Heads and the SES are by law required to promote as well as uphold them. The Public Service Commissioner's statutory responsibilities include evaluating the extent to which agencies incorporate and uphold the Values.

The Commission released two key documents last year:

• APS Values and Code of Conduct in Practice: A Guide to Official Conduct for APS Employees and Agency Heads; and
• Embedding the Values, a good practice guide for APS managers.

Central to these two guides is a suggested framework for understanding and promoting the APS Values. The framework first places the APS Values into four groups:

• the relationship between the APS and the Government and the Parliament
• the relationship between the APS and the public
• workplace relations in the APS, and
• personal ethical behaviour.

This grouping reinforces the role of values in defining key relationships and behaviours as the basis for the sustained integrity of an organisation. It is these relationships and behaviours that establish the principles of our modern Westminster-style Public Service, and effectively define our institution within Australia's democratic system of government.

Secondly, the framework provides guidance on how to embed the Values, and bridge the potential gap between rhetoric and reality. Embedding the Values involves three areas of activity:

• commitment, including leadership and training;
• management, including administrative systems and procedures agencies use for corporate governance and performance management; and
• assurance, including the handling of breaches of the Code and surveys of staff and clients to give management confidence that the Values are being widely upheld.

The Guide to Official Conduct has several chapters on the relationship between the APS and the Government and Parliament. Three key Values are relevant here:

• apolitical, performing our functions in an impartial and professional manner;
• openly accountable for actions, within the framework of ministerial responsibilities to the Government, the Parliament and the Australian public;
• responsive to the Government in providing frank, honest, comprehensive, accurate and timely advice and in implementing the Government's policies and programs.

These Values come as a set, and we should not pursue any one of them to the point that our actions conflict with another Value-a balance is required.

The Guide's key chapter on working with the Government and the Parliament is written in a style intended to promote a good relationship, rather than to highlight boundaries. Its emphasis is on trust, and on good common sense. Yet it also does indicate important boundaries, clarifying respective roles and responsibilities.

Importantly, it states firmly that the requirement in the Code of Conduct to comply with all applicable laws is unequivocal. Many commentators over the last two decades, in endorsing the need for greater responsiveness, have highlighted that the elected Government alone has the authority to determine the public interest in terms of policies and programs, not the Public Service. That is right. But the Public Service does have clear responsibility in my view for protecting the public interest in terms of ensuring compliance with the law and promoting due process for administrative decision-making. It also has a vital role in providing a longer-term perspective to decision-making and policy making.

Last year's State of the Service Report examined how well the Service is upholding the Values, drawing in particular on an Agency Survey and an Employee Survey. Most of you will have seen the results, but let me remind you of some of the findings about our relationship with the Government and the Parliament:

SLIDE 1

While we did not define 'contact', I found this result astounding. Our more detailed examination of it by agency makes me confident it is pretty reliable. Departments commonly have 50% and more of their staff who come into contact with the Minister or advisers. There is nothing necessarily wrong with that, but there is the obvious question of how confident are we that our staff have a deep understanding of the Values and will manage these contacts with the integrity and professionalism we believe is essential.

SLIDE 2

Overall, our staff are pretty confident they can balance the Values of apolitical professionalism, open accountability and responsiveness. Not surprisingly the SES are most confident. The APS staff are also pretty confident, perhaps because the matters they deal with are more straightforward. There is a worrying 16% of EL's with low or very low levels of confidence.

SLIDE 3

Apart from classification levels, these correlations are generally not surprising, but they are important, particularly for us in our leadership roles. Those who have faced a challenge are less confident: that tells us we need to provide support to those who face challenges. Confidence in this area and overall job satisfaction go hand in hand. Familiarity with the Values does increase confidence. Leadership matters-if our staff don't think managers act in accordance with the Values, they lose confidence also. Indeed, only 63% of employees believe that their most senior managers act in accordance with the Values. This may be just perception, but leaders need to know that it is out there.

SLIDE 4

These results did not surprise me greatly, and the last one provides a considerable degree of comfort. In my experience, most senior people find working with Ministers and advisers a challenge from time to time. If that were not so, there would not be the huge literature there is on the interface between the administrative and political arms of the executive. Fortunately, most people work their way through these challenges. But it is important to note that our EL's also frequently face challenges, as do a fair number of APS staff. Their contact is increasing and deepening. They need good support from the APS leadership cadre.

SLIDE 5

I do not want to exaggerate the importance of formal protocols, such as minimum sign off for briefs. But as the findings from the State of the Service surveys suggest, we have some way to go to ensure that the many staff in regular contact with Ministers' Offices do understand their obligations. They need good quality oversight to guide them, and to ensure the overall performance of agencies in servicing Ministers.

Current issues

Let me turn now to some specific issues that have gained some attention in the last year.

(a) Record-keeping

Peter Shergold soon after becoming Secretary of the Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet highlighted the importance of record-keeping. The ANAO, of course, has regularly expressed concern over the last five years about the quality of record-keeping. Together with Archives, they have been promoting better systems of record-keeping in the electronic age. The obstacles to good record-keeping are also related, however, to busy-ness and to implicit and explicit political pressures in an era of far greater transparency.

It is important that we reaffirm some key truths:

• record-keeping is essential to good administrative decision-making, to consistency and fairness, to impartiality, to continuous learning and improvement, and to effective risk management;
• record-keeping is a statutory responsibility under the Archives Act;
• there are public benefits from public access to the information we hold, which have been firmly endorsed by the Parliament through a range of legislation and actions, and clarified by a series of decisions in the Courts.

The ANAO, and the Commission, do not suggest that every meeting be recorded, or file notes prepared on every phone call, or every email be retained. And the possibility of public access may properly influence how some communications are recorded.

It is important, however, to resist pressure to avoid records, where they would indeed clarify the decision-making process and accountability. Having no record, or no recollection, is not a clever way of avoiding political embarrassment: it is evidence of a lack of professionalism and lack of appreciation of the Value of open accountability.

I am nonetheless mindful of legitimate concerns that the FOI Act and similar transparency measures may constrain good decision-making processes. Public administration has generally improved as a result of administrative law reforms, but perhaps some of the downside risks need to be more openly acknowledged and discussed. Interestingly, the Senate's own approach to questioning public servants is more accepting of the need to keep our advice on policy confidential, than has been the approach of the courts in interpreting the FOI Act. Some time, I would like to see some balanced discussion of these matters in the Parliament. That would certainly be preferable to pressure for less and more anodyne record-keeping.

(b) Leaking and whistleblowing

I was pleased to see in the recent exchange of articles in the Canberra Times, Jack Waterford acknowledged the self interest of the media in leaks and so-called 'whistleblowing'. Inevitably, the media will understate the public interest in confidential decision-making, and in ensuring trust between Ministers and officials.

It is always possible to cite worthy intentions by individuals who leak, and give examples of the cases where poor decisions have been exposed by leaks noting the public interest then served by the subsequent corrective action. Yet the downside, even in cases of worthy intentions and poor decisions, is considerable. Inevitably, the lack of trust constrains relationships, reduces departmental influence and the range of experience and expertise that goes with it, and limits the range of perspectives that can be brought to bear. Often, it also constrains the range of information that agencies provide to the public through speeches, research and so on.

While acknowledging there are arguments about their coverage, I believe our whistleblowing procedures are about right. They protect the person who uses legitimate avenues to raise concerns, and they oblige Agencies (and the Commission) to have such avenues available. But, of course, they don't offer publicity-seekers the opportunity to press publicly their particular views of government policy or program administration.

Resignation is the honourable course if a public servant so disagrees with a policy that he or she cannot loyally and confidentially continue to serve the Government. Thus, in my view, Mr Wilkie was right to resign. His actions would not have been acceptable had he stayed in the Service. Indeed, I would question his action immediately prior to leaving, when he provided information to the Bulletin without authority.

I have far less respect for the anonymous leaker, who retains his or her position in the Service, and somehow believes his or her action is in the public interest. And there is evidence of some staff doing this at the moment. Whether or not Ministers and advisers leak confidential information, APS employees have very clear legal obligations in this area, notwithstanding the recent Bennett case.

(c) Ministerial advisers

There has been a lot of debate, and a recent Parliamentary Committee Inquiry, around the role of Ministerial advisers. There is clearly now a party-political debate that it is not proper for me to enter into directly. But as a statutory officer I have given evidence to the Parliamentary Committee, and I have made some other public comments.

The adviser system is now well entrenched into Australian public administration. The SOSR results demonstrate how extensively they interact with the Service. There are about as many advisers as there are officers in the Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet. The number in the Australian Government is an order of magnitude greater than the number in New Zealand (around 20) or the UK (around 80).

The system has provided Ministers with essential support that is partisan, without compromising the apolitical role of the APS. It is important to remember that the Labor Party in 1982 proposed partisan appointments within the SES before they agreed instead in 1984 to introduce the MOPS Act.

The system will not go away. The fact is, it works and generally works well. Indeed, it can act as a buttress to the apolitical role of the Service, a point echoed in recent UK reports. The challenge is to build close, cooperative, professional relationships that do not compromise the role of the APS and our obligations towards the APS Values.

On the APS side, this requires deep understanding of our Values, and open discussion and good leadership within Agencies about the relationship and about the judgments senior people in particular are making in handling the relationship. The SES must engage with staff about how you are meeting your obligations under the Act in your dealing with advisers and Ministers.

In my view, there is also a need to put more effort into the professionalism of advisers. I suspect there is no real controversy about this objective: the debate is primarily about the degree of codification required to promote professionalism. Our Guide to Official Conduct does in fact go some way, by clarifying that advisers do not have the power to direct, and by emphasising the obligations of APS employees. The Prime Minister's Guide to Ministers also goes some way highlighting the importance of a close professional relationship with the APS. Personally, I would like this to go further. I am also keen to see ANZSOG offer training opportunities for MP's, Ministers and MOPS staff, along the lines offered in the UK.

(d) Media relations

The relationship between the media and the Public Service has not got as much direct attention in Australia as in the UK, but it was a significant element in the Children Overboard case. Also, it is often the case that the adviser who finds the Service most difficult, and vice versa, is the media adviser. This is not all that surprising given the media adviser's focus on the next hour or two, certainly not the months and years ahead, and her or his focus on the political impact rather than the broader policy strategy.

It is understandable, and entirely proper, that Ministers wish to have oversight of agencies' public communications arrangements. Communications are at the heart of the political process. Yet it is not necessarily good practice for communications to be channelled exclusively through Ministers and their Offices. There are professional roles to be played by the Service itself, including directly with the media.

The MAC Report on Whole of Government released on Tuesday, for example, notes that media briefing in crises might in some cases be more appropriately handled by departmental employees, and suggests protocols to guide when officials rather than Ministers should lead public communication. Explaining decisions made at the administrative level under program legislation may also often be better handled by officials. Regulators in particular are likely to be more appropriate spokesmen for the decisions they are responsible for, rather than their Ministers. In Health, that was often the case in areas such as nursing homes, TGA, food; in Treasury, it is usually the case for the ACCC and ASIC for example.

Communications management is in fact a growing responsibility in public administration, to help successful implementation of new initiatives and effective delivery of programs. Media management in particular requires skills and expert support.

Two recent reports in the UK have highlighted issues surrounding relations between the Government, the Public Service and the media. They are the Hutton Inquiry, which investigated the circumstances surrounding the apparent suicide of weapons expert and civil servant, David Kelly; and the Phillis Report of the independent review of government communications.

The Hutton Inquiry concluded there was no serious concern that the strictly independent intelligence committee received their expert media advice from Alistair Campbell, the Prime Minister's most senior adviser, because at all times Campbell emphasised that nothing should be in the report with which the intelligence committee were not entirely happy. I am not so sure. The committee may well have needed help from media-savvy experts in understanding how their report might be treated by the media, but I doubt the media's response to their report did in fact reflect the committee's own judgment on the balance of the evidence they presented.

Interestingly in the Hutton Inquiry Report, it is clear that Dr Kelly did have some authority to provide background to the media on Iraq matters, and the MoD circular on "Contacts with the Media" states, in almost the opening sentence, that 'We ought to be as open as we can in explaining what we are doing and why". The circular goes on to confirm the need for Ministerial approval and the consequences of unauthorised leaks, but it is interesting to note the clear expectation that there will be substantial contact between officials and the media. The guidance reads differently to what I suspect would be in most instructions in Australia.

The Phillis Report also contrasts quite sharply with Australian practice, and has led to the establishment of a new Permanent Secretary position within the Civil Service in charge of government communications.  Australian practice accepts more clearly the importance of communication to the political process.

There are dangers in going too far in either direction.  I have no doubt the appropriateness of Ministerial oversight of communications and of the importance of this in a world where the media is increasingly pervasive and capable.  But the good management of programs and initiatives also requires communications expertise at the officials level, and there is public interest in access to information and to the background to government policies.  The Phillis Report highlights the importance of modern communications to the Civil Service, as a service for citizens, and recommends the raising of professional standards in the Service.  Importantly, it does so in the same breath as it recommends maintaining Civil Service impartiality.  It recommends new rules governing the conduct of special advisers and defining more clearly the boundaries with the Civil Service, stating that the principle of Civil Service impartiality must underpin these guidelines.

Clearly UK arrangements do differ quite significantly from our own.  But within the necessary political control over communications, good practice should allow significant direct contacts between officials and the media. 

(e) Frank and fearless advice

A lot has been written on the issue of frank and fearless advice, and I doubt I can add much more. I like the Sir William Cole observation that officials should know where the dividing line is between pressing an argument and nagging, and I share Roger Beale's recent comment that the biggest risk to the provision of straightforward advice has always arisen not from fear but from the desire to be liked by our political masters, loved by an external constituency or to push a personally preferred policy line.

On the one hand there is the responsibility to support the Minister, and the article a few years' back by Behm, Bennington and Cummane ('A Value-creating model for effective policy services',  Journal of Management Development, vol 19, no. 3, 2000, pp 162-178) provides interesting and mostly useful suggestions for high quality services based on extensive interviews with Ministers. On the other hand-and the two are not necessarily in conflict-the APS Value of responsiveness includes the requirements of frankness, comprehensiveness and accuracy, and we also have the Values of apolitical professionalism and open accountability.

However I look at it now, I do not believe the Children Overboard case was the Service's finest hour. Whatever the circumstances in the lead up to the election-and I am still uncomfortable with what happened over that period-the reluctance by officials to face up to the facts over the subsequent months is extremely difficult to defend.

A letter in last weekend's Canberra Times, from Chris Ansted, expresses unease about the emphasis of the last decade on business-like approaches ('Newspeak' he calls it). In particular he is concerned about references to the Minister being the "primary customer".

I do in fact have a lot of sympathy with Chris Ansted (who I do not know), and I have never felt comfortable with those whose corporate plans state that the Minister is the primary customer. There is a danger that this might encourage staff-and senior management-to shift inappropriately the balance of responsibilities between these three key Values. I also always felt it encouraged too inward-looking a culture. My personal preference as a Departmental Secretary was to have the corporate plan endorsed by the Minister, demonstrating our responsiveness to the Minister, with the plan then focussing on our priorities in addressing the real problems out there in the community, and our external "customers".

But I also remain uneasy about using the term "customer", even in relation to the recipients of our services. In most cases, we should be referring to "citizens", who are not always right, and who have obligations as well as rights and needs and wants.

Getting these balances right is a constant challenge. A similar challenge is coming up in the important push for better whole of government management. Peter Shergold's preface to the latest MAC Report has a very useful caution in it. Commitment to a whole of government perspective must not be interpreted as a call for 'group think'. Collective decision-making needs to be based upon the best informed articulation of the challenges faced and a strategic assessment of the relative merits of different approaches to how they might be addressed.

In reflecting on the issues around the Lieutenant-Colonel Collins case of the last week, a similar thought crossed my mind. It is vitally important to not only allow but foster different perspectives, and to ensure facts and expert analysis are brought to bear in the advice we provide. That said, and I am not presuming to comment in any way on the Collins case, there will always be some whose views are heard but not upheld as other information and analysis is considered. In the case of Indonesia and East Timor, there has been a legitimate debate amongst professional experts within both the Public Service and the Military for 25 years.

(f) Appointments and performance management

'Politicisation' in terms of appointments into the Service of people who are partisan, is not a major issue for the APS, in my view. But there are issues around the appointment process, contracts and performance pay for Secretaries.

Most importantly, the PS Act expressly prohibits patronage and favouritism (s. 17), and states firmly that Agency Heads are not subject to direction by any Minister in relation to the exercise of powers in relation to particular individuals. That prohibits directions about all appointments, promotions, transfers, performance pay etc below the Agency Head. The Commissioner's rules around the SES also protect the system from politicisation, and actively promote a leadership cadre that understands and promotes the APS Values. Interestingly, despite all the flexibilities we have introduced, most of our SES are ongoing employees, not on term contracts.

Arrangements for Agency Heads have always been different. Essentially, two principles are involved. Firstly, that the appointments will have regard to merit. Secondly, that the Government of the day must have confidence that the Agency Head will work well with the Minister and pursue the Government's policies and manage effectively the Government's programs.

These two principles apply in other Westminster systems including the UK, Canada and New Zealand. Each has slightly different ways of addressing them. The Australian system has the least constraint on the elected Government making the appointments, the New Zealand system the most. In New Zealand, the State Services Commissioner is in fact the employer and as a matter of course his appointments are made after open advertisement and merit competition. He does, however, consult closely with the Prime Minister and the relevant Minister and would regard his appointment process a failure if these Ministers did not have confidence in the individual he appoints. In the UK, the Civil Service Commissioners advise the Prime Minister on any external appointments, and again advertise and shortlist on the basis of merit competition. They usually put forward only one name, but there is discussion currently about a process that might allow more interaction with the Prime Minister on the final choice. Canada's system is most similar to our own, but the advice from the Clerk of the Privy Council is supported by a substantial process involving a Committee of Senior Officials and a dedicated Deputy with resources to support succession management and senior appointments.

In Australia, the Prime Minister makes the appointment after receiving a report from the Secretary of the Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet. The Secretary is also required to consult the Minister concerned before providing his report. I play the Secretary's role in respect of filling the position of Secretary of the Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet. I have also developed Helen Williams' initiative of some years ago. I provide the Secretary of PM & C with information gleaned mostly from Agency Heads on their views of the requirements for the positions and the possible candidates; the information also includes details of Band 3 officers in particular, mostly provided by them through their Agency Heads. Thus the Secretary of PM & C increasingly has similar support information to that provided in Canada. My role is not, however, an explicit function under the Public Service Act.

Performance pay arrangements for Secretaries are not in legislation, but reflect the policy of the Government, with pay rates set by the Remuneration Tribunal. The process in Australia is based on the Prime Minister making the final decision, after receiving advice from the Secretary of PM & C and the Public Service Commissioner. Before providing that advice, we consult the Minister concerned, focussing on a self assessment prepared by the Secretary and, in most cases, already discussed with the Minister. In New Zealand, the decision lies with the State Services Commissioner who is the employer. He does consult the relevant Minister, but mostly he provides a close and supportive performance feedback system himself. He has four deputies to assist him, each with CEO-level experience, and they also provide coaching support. In Canada, the decision in theory lies with the Prime Minister but, as I understand it, the Clerk's advice is rarely if ever disputed, and it is based on quite elaborate processes involving again the Committee of Senior Officials.

Any system of performance pay for Secretaries presents challenges, most particularly in separating the responsibilities of Ministers and Secretaries, and ensuring the full breadth of responsibilities of Secretaries are considered. Again, I have built on Helen Williams' initiatives to clarify the criteria for assessing performance. These include criteria relating to responsiveness to the Minister, to the Government's overall priorities and to implementing Government initiatives, as well as criteria relating to management, leadership and upholding and promoting the Values. Peter Shergold indicated earlier this week the intention to give more emphasis to whole-of-government priorities such as Indigenous wellbeing.

Changes in tenure and the introduction of performance pay have been made in order to improve responsiveness. Not surprisingly, therefore, they do present some challenges for maintaining the other obligations on Agency Heads and the Service.

As an aside, I should say that arrangements in some State jurisdictions are considerably less robust than ours, not only for Agency Heads but also for the SES. Accordingly, politicisation is a more serious issue, in my view, in several States.

(g) Relations with the Parliament

Most of my comments today concern our relations with Ministers and the Government. Notwithstanding references in the PS Act to the framework of Ministerial accountability to the Parliament and the Australian public, increasingly public servants have direct accountability to the Parliament.

The Guide to Official Conduct contains some practical advice around this. The key is to remember we need to maintain the confidence of both the Minister, and the Parliament. We are required by Parliament to provide full and accurate information about the factual and technical background to policies and their administration. This may include reasons for the policy, but not comment on policy.

Mostly, we know when we are likely to be asked sensitive questions, and when full and accurate information on the facts may be politically embarrassing. We are not expected to volunteer information, and we do need to forewarn Ministers where information that would have to be provided could be politically contentious. We are expected, reasonably, to explain the reasons for policy in a way that is likely to help the achievement of the policy objectives. But we do not mislead, or actively avoid answers or cross the line to sell policy rather than explain it.

All of you know this is not always easy. Yet, on the whole, I believe public servants get this pretty right.

(h) Caretaker Arrangements

I won't go into caretaker matters in any detail. The only comment I'd like to make today is to remind everyone that the Government is the Government until the election result is clear. Until the caretaker period begins, there should be no diminution in our support: the term of government is short enough without public servants shortening it further. When caretaker arrangements begin, the Government is still the Government, but by convention a number of important constraints come into operation. Agency Heads and the SES have particular responsibility for advising Ministers, and staff, of the conventions and their interpretation in particular circumstances as they arise.

The Commission, with assistance from PM & C, will be offering training on caretaker arrangements within the next few months.

Conclusions

I have tried this morning to cover a number of the aspects of our relations with Ministers and the Parliament that have received media attention over the last year. My main message is to remind you, the SES, of your responsibilities not only to uphold the Values but also to promote them.

I do not accept the charge that the APS is greatly politicised, but we would be foolish not to acknowledge that the changes of the last 20 years have added to the risk of compromise. There is also evidence of some compromise, for example in record-keeping, and perceptions amongst a number of our staff that we are not always upholding the Values properly. Indeed, there is a worrying minority with low or very low levels of confidence in their own ability to get the balance right, and responses to our survey include anecdotes indicating what staff believe has been inappropriate behaviour at more senior levels.

We have added responsibility therefore to nurture those attributes of the Australian Public Service that are central to its role as an institution in our democratic system.

 

* While the SES Breakfast operated according to the Chatham House rule, I have agreed to make my talk available across the APS through the Commission website. This version is not exactly as presented, and contains some additional material.

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